What Orbán has done in Hungary is not the sudden destruction of democracy, but its gradual reconfiguration. Institutions still exist, elections still take place, and laws are still passed — but the balance has shifted.
Over time, key checks and balances have been weakened:
the judiciary has been brought under political influence,
large parts of the media landscape have been consolidated,
and the electoral system has been redesigned in ways that favour the incumbent.
This is what makes the model effective. It does not abolish democracy — it hollowes it out from within.
At the same time, the system is reinforced through patronage and control over economic resources, creating a structure where political loyalty and access to state benefits become closely linked.
Orbán himself calls this an “illiberal democracy”. In practice, it is a system where democratic legitimacy is maintained formally, while political competition becomes increasingly constrained.
The important point — and the reason the article matters — is that this model is not unique to Hungary. It is a template.
Thank you, Hans! This is exactly why I decided to write about this topic. I think it’s essential to learn about Hungary’s lessons around the world so we can act before it’s too late.
The piece captures something essential about Viktor Orbán’s system: it is not an outright dictatorship, but a gradual reshaping of democratic institutions from within.
What stands out is the method. This is not about abolishing elections, but about tilting the playing field — through control of media, pressure on civil society, and legal changes that favour the ruling party. Over time, this creates what many analysts describe as an “illiberal democracy” or even an electoral autocracy.
The key point is therefore not whether Hungary still votes — it does — but whether the system remains genuinely competitive. That is where most of the concern lies.
At the same time, Orbán’s durability should not be underestimated. His model combines nationalism, economic patronage, and political centralisation in a way that still resonates with a significant part of the electorate.
So the real question is less how democracy is bent — and more why it continues to command enough support to endure.
Peter
Your core argument is difficult to dismiss.
What Orbán has done in Hungary is not the sudden destruction of democracy, but its gradual reconfiguration. Institutions still exist, elections still take place, and laws are still passed — but the balance has shifted.
Over time, key checks and balances have been weakened:
the judiciary has been brought under political influence,
large parts of the media landscape have been consolidated,
and the electoral system has been redesigned in ways that favour the incumbent.
This is what makes the model effective. It does not abolish democracy — it hollowes it out from within.
At the same time, the system is reinforced through patronage and control over economic resources, creating a structure where political loyalty and access to state benefits become closely linked.
Orbán himself calls this an “illiberal democracy”. In practice, it is a system where democratic legitimacy is maintained formally, while political competition becomes increasingly constrained.
The important point — and the reason the article matters — is that this model is not unique to Hungary. It is a template.
Thank you, Hans! This is exactly why I decided to write about this topic. I think it’s essential to learn about Hungary’s lessons around the world so we can act before it’s too late.
I am hoping that April the 12. will put an end to the misery.
Peter
The piece captures something essential about Viktor Orbán’s system: it is not an outright dictatorship, but a gradual reshaping of democratic institutions from within.
What stands out is the method. This is not about abolishing elections, but about tilting the playing field — through control of media, pressure on civil society, and legal changes that favour the ruling party. Over time, this creates what many analysts describe as an “illiberal democracy” or even an electoral autocracy.
The key point is therefore not whether Hungary still votes — it does — but whether the system remains genuinely competitive. That is where most of the concern lies.
At the same time, Orbán’s durability should not be underestimated. His model combines nationalism, economic patronage, and political centralisation in a way that still resonates with a significant part of the electorate.
So the real question is less how democracy is bent — and more why it continues to command enough support to endure.
I love the succinct way you express this :)
Thank you so much, Helen! I appreciate your kind words.